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I. INTRODUCTION 
Those who follow Supreme Court litigation know that the Court is 
prone to let issues percolate in state and lower federal courts before granting 
certiorari.1 Environmental litigation is no exception. Knowing this, it seems 
only a matter of time before the Court revisits an intensely-litigated issue it 
                                                                    
* Professor, Regent University School of Law. B.A., 1971, University of Kansas; Masters of 
Public Administration, 1981, University of Southern California; J.D., 1989, Regent 
University School of Law. Special thanks to Mr. Neil Cohen for his helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this article. 
1
 See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We have 
in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of 
‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a 
better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”); see also Tom S. 
Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower Courts: 
An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 J. POL. 150 (2013). 
1
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last addressed twelve years ago2—the remedies available to private parties 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”),3 and the relationship between those remedies. 
This matter is critical for those caught in the web of environmental cleanup 
because the two remedies available to them under CERCLA—cost recovery 
under § 107 and contribution under § 113—are entirely distinct.4 Whichever 
remedy a court affords plaintiffs will affect the litigants’ burden of proof, the 
standard of liability, the available defenses, the allocation of costs, and the 
applicable statutes of limitations—indeed, the entire proceeding.5 
Furthermore, given the cost of environmental response actions, the effect 
on a party’s financial liability pursuant to a court’s decision on this issue can 
be staggering.6 
This article suggests this issue is not only worthy of the Court’s 
attention but may now be ripe for consideration. First, there is a clear split 
of authority among the federal courts with respect to several questions left 
unresolved when the Court last addressed this issue in Atlantic Research.7 
Second, the lower courts’ positions on these questions are becoming 
increasingly well-defined and articulated.8 Third, without further 
clarification, those exposed to liability under CERCLA face uncertainty and 
extremely high financial risks.9 Finally, if not addressed, some positions 
taken by lower courts have the capacity to be both unfair to the parties 
involved and counterproductive to CERCLA’s goals.10 
                                                                    
2
 See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007) (discussed at greater length 
in Part II of this article). 
3




 See Steven Ferrey, Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When the Lower Federal 
Courts Don’t Follow the Supreme Court, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 151, 153–54 
(2016). See also infra notes 28–36 and accompanying text. 
6
 See Ferrey, supra note 5, at 154 (suggesting that the cost of cleaning up the nation’s 
hazardous waste sites over the next 40 years could exceed $250 billion, much of which would 
be borne by private parties). Ferrey cited U.S. EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION’S WASTE 
SITES: MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS viii (2004), and noted that the cost estimate 
included Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) corrective action initiatives 
and the cleanup up of leaking underground storage tanks.  
7
 See infra Part III. 
8
 See id. 
9
 See infra Part IV. 
10
 As the courts have noted, CERCLA’s language may be “inartful,” but its goals are 
“straightforward”—to “promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure 
that the costs of such cleanup efforts [are] borne by those responsible for the contamination.” 
Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 200 (7th Cir. 2012). 
2
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It is not surprising that courts could disagree on the application of 
CERCLA. The statute has never been considered a “model of legislative 
clarity.”11 It was, after all, hastily enacted by Congress as a “last-minute 
compromise”12 during the waning days of a lame-duck session without the 
benefit of full technical revisions of the text.13 Although the House and 
Senate had considered related legislation for years, the bill that finally 
became law was hurriedly put together with little debate and finalized during 
the interim between the 1980 national election and the assumption of office 
by President Reagan. CERCLA’s provisions are complex, and its text has 
been described as “puzzl[ing]” and “cryptic”—even “indecipherable.”14 
Given the haste with which the final bill was negotiated and drafted, its 
legislative history is also largely unhelpful, having been characterized as 
“vague,” “sparse,” and “self-contradictory.”15 The Supreme Court has 
provided some clarity from time to time, but the Atlantic Research opinion 
in 2007 was its last word on this issue, and, in that decision, the Court 
knowingly left a number of critical questions unresolved.16 
Since the Court rendered the Atlantic Research decision, splits of 
authority have developed among the lower courts on several of the case’s 
unresolved questions, and the many disparities those courts have created 
suggest the need for Supreme Court intervention. This article focuses on 
just one of the issues on which the courts are divided: whether a party that 
is eligible to seek contribution under § 113 may simultaneously pursue a 
cost recovery claim under § 107 for unrelated expenses. 
                                                                    
11
 United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 723, 741 (S.D. Ohio 2002).  
12
 Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989). 
13
 See FRANK P. GRAD, 3 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02[1][a] at 4A-23 (1998). 
14
 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005); CP 
Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg Zoino and Assocs., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.H. 1991); 
United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 883 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev’d, 
104 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1997). 
15
 See, e.g., United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Michigan, 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989); Dedham 
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986); United 
States v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 229, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); 
United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., No. 85-CV-73764 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 1989); 
United States v. New Castle Cty., 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265 (D. Del. 1986). One author has 
described CERCLA’s legislative process as “peculiar,” noting that “there were no mark-up 
sessions, hearings, or other public processes.” See Alfred R. Light, CERCLA’s Cost 
Recovery Statute of Limitations: Closing the Books or Waiting for Godot? 16 SE. ENVTL 
L.J. 245, 251 (2008). 
16
 The Court noted, for example, that it was “not decid[ing] whether . . . compelled costs of 
response [incurred directly by a PRP] are recoverable under § 113(f), § 107(a), or both”). 
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 n.6 (2007). 
3
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This article suggests that the answer to that question should be yes. A 
majority of courts that have considered this issue have taken that position, 
but some courts have diverged, creating both uncertainty and unfairness for 
the parties involved. Courts that have taken the minority position appear to 
have done so based upon a false dichotomy, i.e., a perceived choice that is 
unnecessary under the terms of the statute and uncalled for under the 
Atlantic Research decision. A minority of courts have suggested that: (1) a 
private plaintiff may only assert one type of claim—either a cost recovery 
claim or an action for contribution; (2) a determination as to which type of 
claim the plaintiff may assert is inherently based upon either the nature of 
the costs at issue or the procedural status of the party; and (3) of those two 
factors, the party’s procedural status takes priority.17 
The better position—followed by the majority of courts—is that both the 
nature of the costs and the procedural status of the party matter, and to 
ignore the nature of the specific costs claimed is neither necessary nor 
appropriate. Instead, the court should consider the procedural status of the 
party with respect to each specific cost claimed. Under that approach, a 
party might be limited to contribution as a remedy for some costs but, at the 
same time, be permitted to seek full cost recovery for other expenses. This 
approach would be consistent with the text and structure of CERCLA and 
with the Court’s decision in Atlantic Research. It would, furthermore, 
encourage private-party cooperation and reinforce CERCLA’s goal of 
promoting voluntary and timely cleanups. In support of this thesis, Part II 
of this article will discuss the Atlantic Research decision.18 For context, that 
part will briefly explain the alternatives for private cost allocation under 
CERCLA, discuss the historical interplay of §§ 107 and 113, and then 
summarize the decision itself. Part III will discuss the aftermath of Atlantic 
Research in terms of: (1) the substantial number and nature of issues still 
unresolved; (2) the current split among the courts on the question of 
simultaneous contribution and cost recovery claims; and (3) the ongoing 
South Dayton Landfill litigation, which provides a case in point.19 Finally, 
Part IV will address the article’s suggested approach in permitting 
simultaneous claims under §§ 107 and 113 and discuss how such an 
approach would comport with the text and goals of CERCLA and with the 
Court’s decision in Atlantic Research.20 
 
                                                                    
17
 See infra Part III. 
18
 See infra Part II. 
19
 See infra Part III. 
20
 See infra Part IV. 
4
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss1/2
2019] THE SIMULTANEOUS PURSUIT 47 
 
 
II. THE ATLANTIC RESEARCH DECISION 
A. Private Party Cost Allocation Under CERCLA 
From the beginning of the Superfund program in 1980, private party 
remediation has been the “backbone” of the CERCLA process.21 The 
government itself is authorized to clean up contaminated sites with funds 
provided by Congress and then recover its costs from “potentially 
responsible parties” (“PRPs”) under CERCLA § 104.22 Federal funds, 
however, are inadequate to finance the vast majority of cleanups.23 
CERCLA’s success, therefore, depends upon the cooperation of private 
parties to finance the remediation of most sites.24  
Whether a private party conducts a cleanup itself, reimburses the 
government for its response costs, or engages in a combination of the two, 
CERCLA provides private parties two alternative mechanisms for 
recovering all or part of their costs: an action for contribution or a cost 
recovery claim. CERCLA § 113(f)(1) authorizes a PRP that has been sued 
by either the government or another private entity under § 106 or § 107, 
                                                                    
21
 Ferrey, supra note 5, at 200. 
22
 Liability under CERCLA falls upon four classes of potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) 
identified in § 107(a) of the Act: (1) the current owners and operators of a contaminated site; 
(2) anyone who owned or operated the site at the time hazardous substances were disposed 
of; (3) any party that arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at the site; and (4) any 
transporter who was involved in selecting the site for disposal. The broad scope of liability 
reflected in these four categories has been further expanded by the courts’ liberal 
construction. Liability may further extend to corporate parents or subsidiaries of those 
entities, corporate successors, corporate officers and shareholders, trustees, guardians and 
receivers, and, in some cases, secured creditors. See, e.g., United States v. USX Corp., 68 
F.3d 811, 814–15 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 
489 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Amtreco, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 959, 966 (M.D. Ga. 1993); 
Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360, 367 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In 
re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., Nos. 1989-107, 89-220, 89-224 (consol.), 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 19167 (D. V. Sept. 2, 1993, as amended). 
23
 See, e.g., Katherine N. Probst, Superfund 2017: Cleanup Accomplishments and the 
Challenges Ahead 1–29 (ACEC 2017) (noting the inadequacy of EPA’s funding to 
accomplish the agency’s goals); see also Ferry, supra note 5, at 200–01 (asserting that “for 
every site on which EPA traditionally leads the cleanup, private parties clean up one hundred 
sites”).  
24
 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND SITE CLEANUP WORK 
THROUGH ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS AND ORDERS, 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-site-cleanup-work-through-enforcement-
agreements-and-orders [perma.cc/R3DK-W3YN] (noting that roughly 69 percent of all 
cleanup work underway at Superfund sites around the nation is being funded by private 
parties through the enforcement process, and that for every dollar the Superfund 
enforcement program spends, private parties invest eight dollars in cleanup work). 
5
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and has paid an inequitable portion of the cleanup costs, to seek 
contribution from other responsible parties.25 Section 113(f)(3)(B) also 
provides a right of contribution to any party that has “resolved its liability to 
the United States or a State” by “satisfy[ing] a settlement agreement or a 
court judgment” and, in doing so, has paid more than its share of the costs.26 
Alternatively, a party may bring a direct cost recovery action under § 
107(a)(4)(B) if: (1) it has not been sued; and (2) it has incurred costs of its 
own in performing an environmental response.27 
Given a choice between the two alternatives, parties normally choose 
cost recovery for several reasons.28 First, a § 107 cost recovery claim entitles 
a plaintiff to full recovery of expenses with defendants held jointly and 
severally liable, unless defendants can prove that the harm they caused is 
“divisible.”29 In a contribution action under § 113, by contrast, defendants 
are severally liable, and a plaintiff bears the burden of proving each 
defendant’s proportional share of responsibility.30 Second, given the 
                                                                    
25
 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2019) provides: “Any person may seek contribution from any other 
person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following 
any civil action under section 9606 . . . or [ ] 9607(a) of this title.” (emphasis added). As 
originally enacted in 1980, CERCLA did not include an express provision for contribution, 
but a number of district courts held that such a right existed by implication under CERCLA’s 
cost recovery provision in § 107 or as a matter of right under federal common law. See, e.g., 
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161 (2004). 
26
 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 140 (2007). Congress amended 
CERCLA in 1980 through the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA,” 
100 Stat. 1613) to provide an express right to contribution in § 113(f)(1) as well as this 
previously unrecognized contribution right through § 113(f)(3)(B). The provision reads as 
follows: “A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or 
all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or 
judicially approved settlement may seek contribution . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2019) 
(emphasis added). 
27
 See HOBERT, KELSEY-HAYES & NCR, PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI, HOBART V. 
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF OHIO at 16–17 (2015). 
28
 See, e.g., Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(suggesting that, “[g]iven the choice, a rational PRP would prefer to file an action under § 
107(a)(4)(B) in every case” (emphasis added)). 
29
 United States v. Colorado & E. Ry. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (“It is . . . 
well settled that [CERCLA] § 107 imposes joint and several liability . . . .”); accord Pinal 
Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400, 1404 (D. Ariz. 1996); Laidlaw 
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624, 629 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Dartron 
Corp. v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., 917 F. Supp. 1173, 1181 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Steven 
Ferrey, Toxic “Plain Meaning” and “Moonshadow”: Supreme Court Unanimity and 
Unexpected Consequences, 24 VILL. ENTVL. L.J. 1, 8 (2013). 
30
 See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 920 F. Supp. 991, 994 (E.D. 
Ark. 1996) (“CERCLA . . . imposes joint and several liability upon [responsible parties] 
and/or [potentially responsible parties] in § 107(a) cost recovery actions, . . . and several 
6
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differences between several and joint-and-several liability, defendants 
generally bear the costs allocated to “orphan shares” in a cost recovery 
claim, while a plaintiff absorbs those costs in a contribution action.31 Finally, 
the statute of limitations for a cost recovery claim is six years for a remedial 
action,32 while the statute of limitations for a contribution action under § 113 
is only three years.33 Unfortunately, private plaintiffs do not get to choose 
their remedy. The Court has made it clear “that §§ 107(a) and 113(f) 
provide two ‘clearly distinct’ remedies”34 and that a “choice of remedies 
simply does not exist” for private plaintiffs.35 The courts, however, have 
consistently wrestled with determining the precise boundary between the 
two.36 
B. The Historical Interplay of §§ 107 and 113 
A detailed discussion of CERCLA’s early history—and precisely how 
the contribution/cost recovery line was drawn by the courts before SARA37—
is beyond the scope of this article. However, the development of 
contribution as a remedy for private plaintiffs has played a key role in 
CERCLA’s statutory scheme. The 1986 SARA amendments made explicit 
what many courts had previously inferred: that parties who were liable under 
CERCLA could seek contribution from other PRPs.38 In fact, after SARA, 
courts began funneling private parties increasingly toward § 113 and away 
                                                                    
liability in § 113(f) contribution actions.”); accord Fresno v. NL Indus., No. CV-F93-5091, 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15534 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 1995). As a reflection of how established 
the presumption of joint and several liability is, the Atlantic Research Court noted, in passing, 
that “[w]e assume without deciding that § 107(a) provides for joint and several liability.” Atl. 
Research, 551 U.S. at 140 n.7. 
31
 See, e.g., DMJ Assocs., L.L.C. v. Capasso, No. 97-CV-7285 (DLI)(RML), 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 177460, at *72 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015) (explaining that “orphan shares” are “the 
share[s] of cleanup costs at a contaminated site equitably attributable to a PRP that is unable 
to pay” and that they “typically arise when a PRP cannot be located or is insolvent, deceased, 
dissolved, or bankrupt”). 
32
 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B). A remedial action is a response designed to provide a 
permanent remedy at a site, and typically includes one or more specific actions that are listed 
in the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). 
33
 Id. at § 9613(g)(3). 
34
 Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 138 (quoting the Court’s previous decision in Cooper Industries 
v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 163 n.3 (2004)). 
35
 Id. at 140. 
36
 See infra Section II.B. 
37
 Pub. L. 99-499, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. 
38
 See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983); 
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 215 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
7
DeGroff: The Simultaneous Pursuit of Cost Recovery and Contribution under
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
50 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
from § 107 as a means of recovering cleanup costs.39 By 2003, at least ten of 
the federal circuits—every circuit court that had considered the issue—held 
that contribution was the only form of recovery available to liable parties 
under the statute.40 The practical effect of this position was to preclude 
almost all private parties from asserting cost recovery claims or 
counterclaims.41 Hence, it became generally accepted that government 
entities had much freer access to cost recovery under § 107 than did private 
parties.42 
                                                                    
39
 David Fotouhi & Michael K. Murphy, Do CERCLA Cost Recovery and Contribution 
Rights Overlap?, LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2015) at 1 (suggesting that “[t]raffic-directing [by the 
courts] dramatically narrowed Section 107 by judicial fiat” after SARA as “courts gradually 
steered liable parties away from Section 107 and required them to use Section 113”). 
40
 By 2003, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits had all held that liable parties other than government entities were 
precluded from suing or countersuing for cost recovery under § 107. See, e.g., United 
Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1998); 
New Castle Cty. v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997); Axel 
Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 191 F.3d 409, 420 (4th Cir. 1999); Centerior 
Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998); 
NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co., 227 F.3d 776, 791 (7th Cir. 2000); Dico, Inc. v. 
Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525, 532 (8th Cir. 2003); Pinal Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining 
Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998); Young v. 
United States, 394 F.3d 858, 865 (10th Cir. 2005); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland 
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996). Although the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals discussed the question in OHM Remediation Serv. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 
F.3d 1574 (5th Cir. 1997), the court was not faced with that issue and did not directly address 
it. At least some district courts within the Fifth Circuit, however, followed the majority. See, 
e.g., United States v. Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1249 (D. Colo. 2001) (holding that § 
107 counterclaims could be asserted only by federal, state or tribal governments or by a non-
liable parties). 
41
 The Atlantic Research Court correctly observed that, “if PRPs do not qualify as ‘any other 
person’ for purposes of § 107(a)(4)(B), it is unclear what private party would.” Atl. Research, 
551 U.S. at 136. 
42
 See, e.g., United States v. Chrysler Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 849, 860 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 
(noting that a number of courts had “distinguished between federal and private PRPs as to 
whether they may bring cost recovery actions under § 107”); Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances 
Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a 
government entity could bring a cost recovery claim under § 107(a) even if it was itself a liable 
party); Alabama v. Ala. Wood Treating Corp., Inc., Civ. No. 85-0642-CG-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 37372, at *13–*17 (S.D. Ala. June 6, 2006) (noting a split of authority among the 
courts, but finding persuasive the “majority” of courts holding that private parties who are 
PRPs may recover response costs only under CERCLA § 113, while government entities that 
are PRPs may sue for cost recovery under § 107(a)); Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. 
8
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That thinking began to change in 2004 with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services.43 In Cooper Industries, the 
Court suddenly and significantly narrowed access to § 113.44 The case 
stemmed from the discovery of contamination at several industrial sites in 
Texas.45 Aviall Services bought four aircraft engine maintenance facilities 
from Cooper Industries in 1981.46 After operating the plants for some years, 
Aviall discovered that both it and Cooper had contaminated the sites with 
petroleum and other hazardous substances.47 When Aviall reported the 
contamination to state authorities, the authorities threatened to take 
enforcement action, but neither the state nor EPA actually took any 
measures to compel cleanup. Instead, Aviall cleaned up the sites 
“voluntarily” under state supervision and sued Cooper for contribution 
under CERCLA § 113(f)(1).48 
Cooper moved for dismissal of the claim on the basis that Aviall itself 
had not been sued under either §§ 106 or 107.49 Section 113(f)(1), under 
which Aviall had brought its claim, provides that “[a]ny person may seek 
contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under 
[CERCLA] . . . during or following any civil action under [§§ 106 or 107].”50 
Cooper argued that Aviall could claim contribution under this section only 
if enforcement action had first been brought against Aviall.51 The district 
court agreed with Cooper’s argument and granted its motion to dismiss.52 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals initially affirmed that decision, but on 
rehearing en banc, it reversed the lower court’s ruling, holding that “§ 
113(f)(1) allows a PRP to obtain contribution from other PRPs regardless of 
whether the plaintiff has been sued under §§ 106 or 107.”53 
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling by essentially 
reading the word “may” to mean “may only” and holding that § 113(f)(1) 
authorizes an action for contribution only if the plaintiff itself has first been 
subject to enforcement.54 The effect of this decision was to restrict the right 
of contribution to parties that meet specific conditions. Today, as a result of 
                                                                    
43
 543 U.S. 157 (2004). 
44
 Id. at 164. 
45
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 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
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 Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 164. 
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Cooper Industries, to assert a claim for contribution under § 113(f)(1), a 
party must first be sued under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107.55 Similarly, to bring 
a claim for contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B), a plaintiff must first resolve 
some or all of its liability with the United States or a state through an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement.56 
The Cooper Industries court left unsettled the question of whether a 
PRP that did not meet either of these requirements could seek cost recovery 
under § 107 as an alternative. While the Court recognized that that question 
“merit[ed] full consideration,” the parties had not briefed the issue, and the 
Court declined to address it.57 However, with the right to contribution now 
“drastically limited,”58 the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
along with a number of district courts, reversed their previous decisions and 
decided that PRPs that did not qualify for contribution under the Court’s 
more restrictive approach should be allowed to pursue cost recovery.59 That 
thinking was finally affirmed by the Supreme Court three years later with its 
ruling in United States v. Atlantic Research.60 
C. The Court’s Decision 
The facts in Atlantic Research were unique in that the cleanup at issue 
was not compelled either by an enforcement action or by a settlement 
negotiated outside of the enforcement process. The Atlantic Research 
                                                                    
55
 This is true, at least, in most jurisdictions. Other courts, such as the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, have held otherwise based upon a focus on the voluntary/involuntary nature of 
the expenses a plaintiff incurs. The Eighth Circuit’s focus on the “voluntariness” of the 
plaintiff’s costs is founded on language in the Atlantic Research decision to the effect that 
voluntarily incurred cleanup costs may only be recovered through a § 107 claim. 
56
 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). 
57
 Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 168–69. 
58
 Scott Patrick Brand, Note, The Saga Continues—Trying to Find a Balance in CERCLA’s 
PRP Liability Suits, 88 N.D. L. REV. 209, 218 (2012). 
59
 See, e.g., Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 199 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a PRP 
that initiated cleanup action voluntarily, then later received a consent order concerning 
remediation already underway, could recover response costs under § 107(a)); Consol. 
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir. 2005); Metro. Water 
Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 
837 (7th Cir. 2007); City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc’ns Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 180, 223 (D. 
Me. 2006) (holding that PRPs that conduct voluntary cleanups and thus do not meet the 
requirements of § 113(f)(1) may bring claims under § 107); Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 
404 F. Supp. 2d 3, 7 (D.D.C. 2005) (PRP that cannot sue for contribution under § 113 may 
seek cost recovery under § 107). 
60
 551 U.S. 128, 131 (2007). Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that 
the Court’s purpose in accepting the case was to address the question left unresolved in 
Cooper Industries. 
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Corporation had leased property operated by the Department of Defense 
using the facility to retrofit rocket motors under contract with the United 
States government.61 Atlantic Research discovered through its own 
investigation that the property became contaminated.62 The company then 
remediated the site voluntarily and sued the United States under both § 
107(a)(4)(B) and § 113(f)(1) to recover its costs. While the parties were still 
negotiating a settlement, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Cooper Industries. The Court’s decision in Cooper Industries foreclosed 
Atlantic Research’s contribution claim because the company had not been 
subject to a CERCLA enforcement action. The company, therefore, 
amended its complaint going forward only with its cost recovery claim under 
§ 107.63 
Following the Eighth Circuit’s previous holdings—before Cooper 
Industries—the district court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss 
the cost recovery claim.64 This effectively left Atlantic Research with no 
remedy at all under CERCLA. On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit 
followed the reasoning of the recent decisions by the Second and Seventh 
Circuits. Recognizing the unfairness of leaving voluntary remediators with 
no remedy, the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court and held as follows: 
while “PRPs that ‘have been subject to §§ 106 or 107 enforcement actions 
are still required to use § 113,’” those that have not been subject to suit and 
are therefore not entitled to seek contribution may pursue cost recovery 
under § 107.65 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve what had 
become a split of authority among the circuits. The Second, Seventh, and 
Eighth Circuits had now taken the position that PRPs could pursue cost 
recovery claims, while other circuits continued to hold that they could not.66 
In taking the case, the Court expressed its intent to “decide [the] question 
left open in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,” i.e, “whether § 
107(a) provides [PRPs] . . . with a cause of action to recover costs from other 
PRPs.”67 Applying a textualist approach, as the Court historically has with 
CERCLA,68 the Court read § 107(a)(4)(B) in conjunction with subparagraph 
                                                                    
61
 Id. at 133. 
62
 Roberto Cornejo, Not Playing Games: Eighth Circuit’s Response to CERCLA 
Contribution in Light of Aviall, 14 MO. ENVTL L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 352 (2006). 
63
 Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 133. 
64






 Id. at 131. 
68
 See John M. Barkett, CERCLA and the Supreme Court, 29 NAT. RES. & THE ENV’T 58, 
59 (2015). 
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(a)(4)(A). Noting the parallel structure of the two subparagraphs, the Court 
concluded that the phrase “any other person” in subparagraph (B) must 
mean “any person other than [those named in subsection (A) (the United 
States, a State, or an Indian tribe)].”69 “Consequently,” the Court concluded, 
“the plain language of subparagraph (B) authorizes cost-recovery actions by 
any private party, including PRPs.”70 
The Court rejected the notion that its decision would “create friction 
between §§ 107(a) and 113(f)” or that the decision would “offer[] PRPs a 
choice between §§ 107(a) and 113(f).”71 It described §§ 107(a) and 113(f) as 
“two ‘clearly distinct’ remedies” and affirmed that “CERCLA provide[s] for 
a right to cost recovery in certain circumstances . . . and separate rights to 
contribution in other circumstances.’”72 As in Cooper Industries, however, 
the Court clarified some issues while leaving a number of other key 
questions unresolved. Atlantic Research affirmed that PRPs may seek 
contribution under § 113(f)(1) only under limited circumstances: 
When a party pays to satisfy a settlement agreement or a court 
judgment, it does not incur its own costs of response. Rather, it 
reimburses other parties for costs that those parties incurred . . . . 
Hence, a PRP that pays money to satisfy a settlement agreement 
or a court judgment may pursue § 113(f) contribution.73 
At the opposite extreme, the Court stated that PRPs could pursue cost 
recovery claims against other liable parties for “costs [they] incur[] 
voluntarily.”74 The Court further explained that one of the keys in 
determining whether reimbursement would be by cost recovery or 
contribution is whether a plaintiff’s expenses represented: (1) 
reimbursement of another party’s costs; or (2) costs “incurred” directly by 
the plaintiff itself.75 The Court also emphasized that a party “eligible to seek 
contribution under § 113(f)(1)” could not “simultaneously seek to recover 
the same expenses under § 107(a).”76 
Beyond that, however, the Court left a host of critical questions 
concerning the intersection of §§ 107 and 113 unanswered. Those 
unresolved issues have caused obvious confusion among the lower courts. 
The range of unresolved issues and the financial uncertainty they have 
created suggest that, after twelve years of silence on this important matter, it 
                                                                    
69
 Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 135. 
70
 Id. at 136. 
71
 Id. at 137 (quoting the government’s argument). 
72
 Id. at 138 (quoting Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 163 n.3) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73
 Id. at 139. 
74
 Id. at 139 n.6 (emphasis added). 
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may be time for the Court to provide clearer direction for the lower courts 
and the parties involved. 
III. THE AFTERMATH OF ATLANTIC RESEARCH 
A. The Substantial Unresolved Questions 
While Atlantic Research clarified that claims under § 107 may be 
available to PRPs when actions for contribution are not, it did little else to 
“resolve the tension between § 107(a) and § 113(f).”77 As a result, the lower 
courts have opined that “[n]avigating the interplay between § 107(a) and § 
113(f) remains a deeply difficult task”78 and one that “has proven vexing.”79 
Other commentators have expressed the same concern.80 Even a brief 
analysis of the many unresolved questions demonstrates how fractured the 
lower courts have become and how helpful the Court’s guidance would be. 
Among the key questions requiring clarification are the following: (1) May 
costs incurred in response to a unilateral order that is not administratively 
or judicially approved (i.e., “compelled” costs) be recovered through cost 
recovery under § 107? (2) What constitutes an “administrative or 
judicially approved settlement” for purposes of § 113(f)(3)(B)? Must the 
settlement specifically address CERCLA liability, or is the provision broad 
enough to encompass environmental liability generally? What is meant by 
“resolving” one’s liability? If an agreement includes contingencies that are 
not yet fulfilled when the agreement is signed, may the liability be 
considered “resolved” at that point; if not, at what point is eligibility for 
contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B) triggered? 
                                                                    
77
 Ford Motor Co. v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 693, 700 (E.D. Mich. 2014) 
(suggesting that the Atlantic Research decision merely “created a new playing field for these 
issues to unfold”). 
78
 Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 218 (3d Cir. 2010). 
79
 NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 690 (7th Cir. 2014). 
80
 See, e.g., Supreme Court Clarifies Rights of PRPs to Recover Cleanup Costs from Other 
PRPs, and the United States, MARTEN LAW (June 13, 2007), 
https://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20070613-cleanup-cost-recovery [perma.cc/27EU-
S7GP] (noting that the opinion left open whether some PRPs could recover costs under § 
107(a), § 113(f), or both); Kevin A. Gaynor, Benjamin S. Lippard, and Sean M. Lonnquist, 
Unresolved CERCLA Issues After Atlantic Research and Burlington Northern, 40 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 11198 (2010); Luis Inaraja Vera, Note, Compelled Costs Under CERCLA: 
Incompatible Remedies, Joint and Several Liability, and Tort Law, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 394, 
395–96 (2016); Brianna E. Tibett, Note, Reinstating CERCLA as the “Polluter Pays” Statute 
with the Circuit Court’s Mutually Exclusive Approach, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV., syndicated 
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1. Are “Compelled” Costs Recoverable Under § 107? 
The lower courts have expressed divergent views regarding PRPs that 
incur cleanup costs in response to “unilateral orders” that are not driven by 
enforcement actions. Such costs are “compelled” by regulatory authorities 
and are thus not strictly “voluntary.”81 They result, however, from 
interactions outside the administrative or judicial enforcement process.82 
Most courts that have considered this question have held that such unilateral 
orders do not fall within § 113(f)(1) and thus do not trigger a party’s right to 
seek contribution.83 
The Eighth Circuit, however, held in Morrison Enterprises84 that costs 
incurred pursuant to a unilateral administrative order (“UAO”) were 
recoverable only under § 113 because they were not “voluntarily” incurred.85 
Remarkably, the UAO in question was issued twelve years before the 
plaintiff was sued by the EPA; thus, enforcement action was not even 
contemplated at the time the plaintiff’s initial cleanup costs were incurred. 
In its analysis of the issue, the Eighth Circuit focused on a statement in 
footnote 6 of Atlantic Research where the Supreme Court said that “costs 
incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B).”86 The 
Eight Circuit did not address the fact the Supreme Court did not say that 
only voluntarily incurred costs are recoverable under § 107(a)(4)(B).87 
2. What Constitutes an “Administrative or Judicially Approved 
Settlement” for Purposes of § 113(f)(3)(B)? 
As to this question, it might be more accurate to characterize the courts 
as splintered than split. Since approximately 2010, the lower courts have 
broadened the range of settlements that they have found to qualify as 






 See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 93–95 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a plaintiff who conducted cleanup under the terms of a consent order without being sued 
could seek cost recovery under § 107 despite the fact that its expenses were “compelled”); 
Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Env’tl Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 225–29 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that plaintiffs who settled following a suit by EPA were limited to seeking 
contribution under § 113(f)(1), but plaintiffs who settled with EPA without being sued could 
pursue cost recovery claims against defendants); Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 215 
(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a plaintiff who conducted cleanup in response to an 
Administrative Order on Consent whose terms had not yet been fulfilled could assert a cost 
recovery action under § 107(a)). 
84
 Morrison Enters., L.L.C. v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2011). 
85
 Id. at 605. 
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“resolutions” of liability for purposes of § 113(f)(3)(B), and thus, the 
differences among the courts have grown.88 Assuming this trend continues, 
its effect will be to funnel an increasing percentage of claimants away from 
§ 107 cost recovery as a potential remedy under CERCLA.89 
The courts have drawn distinct lines with respect to at least three 
specific questions. First, a number of courts have expressly considered 
whether a release conditioned upon contingencies that are not yet fulfilled 
at the time an agreement is signed constitutes a “resolution” of liability.90 The 
courts have been roughly evenly split on this issue. Some have held that a 
party has not “resolved” its liability for purposes of § 113(f)(3)(B) until all 
conditions listed in the settlement agreement have been met.91 Others have 
held that liability is resolved when the agreement is signed, suggesting that 
the government’s reservation of rights is no different from a provision in any 
contract permitting enforcement in the event of a breach.92 
Second, the courts have diverged as to whether a resolution of liability 
under state law invokes a right to seek contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B). 
While the decisions are too few to identify any clear pattern, cases decided 
after 2009 appear to have trended in the direction of recognizing a 
resolution of claims under state law as a resolution of liability for purposes 
of this provision.93  
Finally, the courts are divided on the question of whether an 
administrative settlement must resolve CERCLA-like liability specifically or 
may include environmental liability of a non-CERCLA nature. Again, the 
trend has been in the direction of broadening the scope of settlement 
agreements that meet the requirement and thus increasing the availability of 
contribution (which, of course, reduces the availability of cost recovery).94 
                                                                    
88
 Fotouhi & Murphy, supra note 39 (suggesting that the private party remedy framework 
under CERCLA is looking more as it did before Aviall and Atlantic Research as courts 
increasingly relegate parties to asserting § 113 claims). 
89
 Id.  
90
 See, e.g., Bernstein v. Bankert, 702 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2012); DMJ Assocs., L.L.C. v. 
Capasso, 97-CV-7285 (DLI)(RML) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177460 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 6, 2015); 
Fla. Power Corp. v. First Energy Corp., 54 F. Supp. 3d 860 (N.D. Ohio 2014). 
91
 Id.  
92
 See, e.g., Asarco, L.L.C. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 14-35723, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14781 
(9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017); HLP Props., L.L.C. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 14 Civ. 1383 
(LGS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114779 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015).  
93
 See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 
2010); MPM Silicones, L.L.C. v. Union Carbide Corp., 931 F. Supp. 2d 387 (N.D.N.Y. 
2013).  
94
 See, e.g., Trinity Indus. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2013); Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 3d 486 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
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B. The Split of Authority on Simultaneous Cost Recovery and 
Contribution Claims 
While some of the questions discussed above have been ably 
addressed by other scholars,95 the issue this article focuses on—the availability 
of simultaneous cost recovery and contribution claims—has received scant 
attention, even though it can profoundly affect parties caught up in 
environmental litigation. Lacking clear direction on this question from the 
Supreme Court, the lower courts have inevitably taken disparate 
approaches. There is no present conflict among the circuit courts, but a 
minority approach has developed among several district courts based upon 
their interpretation of certain appellate opinions and their reading of the 
Court’s Atlantic Research decision. 
The three circuit courts that have considered this issue have all 
answered the question in the affirmative. In Agere Systems v. Advanced 
Environmental Technology Corp.96—a Third Circuit case—plaintiffs sued a 
group of PRPs over liability for toxic waste that was dumped at the Boarhead 
Farms Site in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. For ease of administration, the 
EPA had divided the Site into two Operable Units—“OU-1” and “OU-2.” 
After settling the suit with the EPA, the plaintiffs pooled their resources and 
initiated a cleanup. They then sued more than twenty non-settling 
defendants seeking both cost recovery and contribution under CERCLA.97 
The litigation began in 2000, when the EPA sued three of the plaintiffs 
with respect to OU-1. Those parties eventually entered into a settlement 
agreement with EPA under which they established a trust fund to carry out 
the cleanup under the agency’s supervision.98 Two additional plaintiffs—TI 
Automotive Systems, L.L.C. (TI) and Agere Systems, Inc. (Agere)—were 
not sued by the EPA but agreed with the other three PRPs to contribute to 
the trust fund. In 2001, the EPA brought a second suit against four of the 
plaintiffs (this time including TI) and entered into a second settlement 
agreement with those four to fund a cleanup of OU-2.99 As before, Agere 
agreed with the other four plaintiffs to contribute to the fund. All five 
                                                                    
95
 See, e.g., Amy Luria, CERCLA Contribution: An Inquiry into What Constitutes an 
Administrative Settlement, 84 N. DAK. L. REV. 333 (2008) (discussing what constitutes an 
administrative settlement for purposes of triggering entitlement to seek contribution pursuant 
to § 113(f)(3)(B)); Alfred R. Light, Avoiding the Contribution “Catch-22”: CERCLA 
Administrative Orders for Cleanup Are Civil Actions, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10791 (2016) 
(addressing the same issue); Ferrey, supra note 5. 
96
 602 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2010). 
97
 Id. at 213–14. 
98
 Id. at 212. 
99
 Id. at 212–13. 
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plaintiffs then filed suit against the non-settling defendants in 2002 to 
recover costs for both cleanups. 
In determining which of the plaintiffs’ claims should survive the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
distinguished the costs that were associated with plaintiffs’ settlement 
agreements with the EPA from those costs contributed by TI and Agere to 
the plaintiffs’ trust fund. The three plaintiffs that had been parties to both 
settlement agreements with the EPA were permitted to seek only 
contribution from the defendants for costs they incurred at both Operable 
Units. Agere, by contrast, was permitted to seek cost recovery under § 107 
with respect to its costs for both OU-1 and OU-2. Because Agere had not 
been sued by the EPA or the other plaintiffs before seeking cost recovery 
from the defendants, it did not qualify for contribution regarding either 
Operable Unit. TI was limited to a contribution action with respect to OU-
2 because its claim against the defendants was preceded by the EPA’s suit. 
It was, however, allowed to seek cost recovery with respect to its costs for 
OU-1.100 
In Bernstein v. Bankert,101 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
followed the same approach with respect to two distinct claims by the same 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were trustees of a fund created to finance and oversee 
the cleanup of a site formerly used for waste handling and disposal.102 
Defendants were former owners of the site, their corporate entities, and 
insurers. Plaintiffs entered into two Administrative Orders on Consent 
(“AOCs”) with the EPA, in 1999 and 2002, each of which called for the 
establishment of a fund for cleanup of the site in return for a release from 
liability.103 Plaintiffs then sued the defendants, seeking cost recovery pursuant 
to § 107. 
The court determined that the plaintiffs had complied with the terms 
of the 1999 AOC and obtained a full release from liability.104 That release 
served as a trigger under CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B), thereby providing 
plaintiffs a right to seek contribution. The statute of limitations for 
contribution actions had run, however, so the circuit court affirmed the trial 
court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim for costs related to the 1999 AOC. 
Because plaintiffs had not yet fully complied with the terms of the 2002 
AOC, they had not yet “resolved” their liability with respect to that 
                                                                    
100
 Id. at 237. 
101
 733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2012). 
102




 Id. at 204. 
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agreement, and thus, had not triggered a right to pursue contribution.105 The 
circuit court, therefore, held that plaintiffs established a basis for cost 
recovery under § 107.106 The guiding principle in the court’s analysis was that 
“each CERCLA right of action carries with it its own statutory trigger, and 
each is a distinct remedy available to persons in different procedural 
circumstances.”107 Thus, the cause of action was based upon the plaintiffs’ 
procedural circumstances with respect to each separate claim. 
In the Ninth Circuit, the district court for the Central District of 
California initially adopted the minority approach in Whittaker Corp. v. 
United States.108 Whittaker owned and operated a facility in Santa Clarita, 
California, where it had manufactured munitions for the United States 
government for several decades.109 In 2000, it was one of several parties sued 
by the Castaic Lake Water Agency and other plaintiffs for costs they had 
incurred in responding to contamination in the local water supply. The case 
against Whittaker was settled in 2007.110 In March 2013, Whittaker sued the 
United States under CERCLA § 107 to recover costs it had incurred in 
responding to contamination in soil and groundwater on its own property.111 
Whittaker acknowledged that it could only have sued the United States 
under § 113 for costs associated with the Castaic Lake cleanup, but it 
claimed that it could seek cost recovery under § 107 for the separate costs 
it incurred in cleaning up its own site.112 The district court disagreed and held 
that § 113(f)(1) “does not limit recovery to the scope of the settlement.”113 
Once the right to contribution is triggered under §§ 113(f)(1) or 
113(f)(3)(B), the trial court said, all of a party’s costs—both before and after 
that event—are subject to recovery only under § 113.114 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed that decision, however, finding the reasoning of the Third and 
Seventh Circuits in Bernstein, NCR, and Agere persuasive.115 The Circuit 
                                                                    
105
 Id. at 207. 
106
 Id. at 202. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its approach to this issue two years later, in 
NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 690–92 (7th Cir. 2014). 
Although the court rejected NCR’s position and limited the plaintiff to claims for 
contribution for each of three administrative orders, the court noted that it was bound to 
consider each order individually in determining the remedy applicable. 
107
 Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 202. 
108
 No. CV 13-1741 FMO (JCx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23918 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014). 
109
 Id. at 2. 
110
 Id. at 4–5. 
111
 Id. at 1–3. 
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 Id. at 13. 
113
 Id. at 14. 
114
 Id. at 15. 
115
 See Whittaker Corp. v. United States, 825 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 2016). 
18
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss1/2
2019] THE SIMULTANEOUS PURSUIT 61 
 
 
Court found the procedural circumstances of the plaintiff relevant but only 
with respect to each specific claim. 
The circuit courts, then, have been consistent in their approach to this 
question, but district courts in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have 
differed.116 Part IV of this article discusses in greater detail how and why they 
have differed. The following section highlights, analyzing the South Dayton 
Landfill litigation, the substantial difference this issue can make for a party 
engaged in a CERCLA cleanup. 
C. Valley Asphalt and the South Dayton Landfill: A Case in Point 
A recent case in the Southern District of Ohio—Hobart Corp. v. 
Dayton Power & Light Co.117—tangibly illustrates the need for the Court’s 
attention to this issue. The story involves the Valley Asphalt Corporation, 
which operates an asphalt recycling business in Moraine, Ohio, a suburb of 
Dayton. The City of Moraine provides a commercial and industrial 
presence on the south side of the Dayton metropolitan area. Straddling the 
Miami River and the I-75 corridor, Moraine is strategically located to allow 
Valley Asphalt access to its suppliers and markets. At the city’s north end, 
where the Miami River turns south, is a former sand and gravel quarry. After 
the quarry closed in the early 1940s, the site was operated for over half a 
century as a landfill.118 The former quarry was filled with waste and covered 
with soil over the years and is now the home of several businesses including 
Valley Asphalt.119 
Unfortunately, while being used as a landfill, the site became heavily 
contaminated.120 Following investigation in the early 2000s, responsible 
                                                                    
116
 See, e.g., Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 336 F. Supp. 3d 888, 892–93 (S.D. 
Ohio 2018); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 3d 486, 507 (S.D. Tex. 2015); 
PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ross Dev. Corp., 104 F. Supp. 3d 729, 740 (D.S.C. 2015); Appleton 
Papers, Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
117
 Hobart, 336 F. Supp. 3d 888. 
118
 The South Dayton Dump and Landfill operated from 1941 to 1996 and received both 
municipal and industrial waste. As areas of the landfill were filled, the property was graded 
and either leased or sold to local businesses. Valley Asphalt purchased its present ten-acre 
site in 1993. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION 5, SITUATION ASSESSMENT OF SOUTH 
DAYTON DUMP AND LANDFILL SITE (2011) (hereinafter “Situation Assessment”). 
119
 Valley Asphalt is described in site–related documents as “an asphalt recycling company” 
and now has multiple facilities throughout the Midwest. The Moraine facility, which was 
originally the company’s “base of operations” and is now known as Plant 6, lies at the north 
end of the current Superfund site. Situation Assessment, supra note 118, at 12. 
120
 Public Health Assessment, infra note 126, at 9–10 (citing the presence of volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs), PCBs, heavy metals and pesticides at significant concentrations in the 
soil and groundwater throughout the site). 
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parties undertook a cleanup that is still ongoing.121 Serious remedial actions 
began under the terms of three Administrative Settlement Agreements and 
Orders on Consent (“ASAOCs”) entered into between the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency and three potentially responsible 
parties.122 Valley Asphalt also conducted cleanup on its own property—which 
is considered part of the “site”—under the terms of a Unilateral 
Administrative Order issued to it by EPA in 2013.123 
The three PRPs that signed the ASAOCs—Hobart Corporation, 
Kelsey-Hayes Company, and NCR Corporation (“Plaintiffs” in the ensuing 
litigation)—were among the most prominent users of the landfill. Those 
three parties have conducted much of the cleanup under the terms of the 
three ASAOCs, and they have sued more than thirty other parties 
(Defendants) for contribution in order to recoup a portion of their costs 
under CERCLA. Valley Asphalt has been one of the Defendants from the 
earliest stages of litigation.124 
Although the amount of the Defendants’ liability has not yet been 
determined, it is likely that Valley Asphalt will be required to share in the 
Plaintiffs’ costs to some extent. In addition, Valley Asphalt has spent a 
considerable sum remediating its own property pursuant to the separate 
                                                                    
121
 See Situation Assessment, supra note 118, at 6–7; Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light 
Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 835, 841–42 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light 
Co., No. 3:13-cv-115, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203684, at *21 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 11, 2017). 
122
 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION 5, ADMINISTRATIVE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND 
ORDER ON CONSENT FOR REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY (2006) (“2006 
ASAOC”); U.S ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION 5, ADMINISTRATIVE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND ORDER ON CONSENT FOR REMOVAL ACTION (2013) (2013 ASAOC); U.S 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION 5, ADMINISTRATIVE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND 
ORDER ON CONSENT FOR REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR OU1 AND 
OU2 (2016) (2016 ASAOC). 
123
 Order Pursuant to Section 106(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, As Amended (Docket No. V-W-13-C-008). 
124
 On May 24, 2010, Plaintiffs sued eight Defendants, including Valley Asphalt, under 
CERCLA §§ 107(a) and 113(f)(3)(B) (Hobart I). On June 29, 2012, Plaintiffs sued four 
additional companies for the same claims (Hobart II). On February 8, 2013, the District 
Court ruled on both cases, dismissing Plaintiffs’ cost recovery claim under § 107 due to their 
eligibility for contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B) based on the 2006 ASAOC. The court also 
dismissed Plaintiffs’ contribution claim as untimely. See Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of 
Ohio, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (S.D. Ohio 2013). The Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal 
of both claims. See Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 
2014). In April 2013, Plaintiffs sued all the Defendants included in the Hobart I and II claims 
for contribution. Those claims, and Defendants’ possible counterclaims, are now being 
resolved. 
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order it received from EPA in 2013—the UAO.125 Valley Asphalt incurred 
this separate liability even though other parties—including the Plaintiffs—may 
well have been responsible for much of that contamination.126 Whether, and 
to what extent, Valley Asphalt can recover those costs from the responsible 
parties goes to the heart of the question addressed in this article—a question 
the Supreme Court left unresolved when it last spoke to the issue of 
CERCLA’s private party remedies. At this point, the district court has held 
that Valley Asphalt will be limited to a contribution action and that it may 
assert its claim only against parties other than the Plaintiffs.127 This will place 
a significant evidentiary burden on Valley Asphalt and will severely limit its 
potential recovery assuming it pursues that claim. 
In the world of CERCLA, Valley Asphalt’s concerns are modest, and 
its story alone might not warrant significant attention. But its experience is 
not unique. The remedy sought by Valley Asphalt against the Plaintiffs has 
been pursued by other parties similarly situated at sites throughout the 
country, and the company’s dispute against the Plaintiffs highlights the need 
for further clarity regarding “the interplay between [CERCLA] § 107(a) and 
§ 113(f).”128 The author suggests that, with its adverse holding in Valley 
Asphalt’s case, the district court has misinterpreted CERCLA’s cost 
recovery framework, applying it in a way that would discourage voluntary 
cleanups and be counterproductive to CERCLA’s goals. 
D. The Problem—An Unwarranted Contribution/Cost Recovery 
                                                                    
125
 See, e.g., Defendant Valley Asphalt Corporation’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended 
Complaint, Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim at 7, ¶ 133, Hobart Corp. v. The Dayton 
Power and Light Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 835 (S.D. Ohio 2014); BOWSER-MORNER, DRAFT 
VAPOR INTRUSION MITIGATION WORK PLAN FOR VALLEY ASPHALT PROPERTY/SOUTH 
DAYTON DUMP & LANDFILL (2013) (hereinafter “Vapor Intrusion Work Plan”).  
126
 Valley Asphalt leased its present ten–acre site and has operated an asphalt plant at that 
location since the mid–1950s. It purchased the property in 1993, and the landfill closed three 
years later. In 1997, buried drums containing hazardous waste were discovered on Valley 
Asphalt’s property when the company installed a new sewer line at the plant. Only then did 
the parties realize that the landfill had extended as far north as the southern half of Valley 
Asphalt’s property. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC 
HEALTH ASSESSMENT FOR SOUTH DAYTON DUMP AND LANDFILL, MORAINE, 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO EPA FACILITY ID: OHD980611388 (2008) (hereinafter 
“Public Health Assessment”); see also Vapor Intrusion Work Plan, supra note 125. 
127
 Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 336 F. Supp. 3d 888, 896 (S.D. Ohio 2018). 
Valley Asphalt asserted a counterclaim against the Plaintiffs for cost recovery under § 107 
for the costs it incurred under the 2013 UAO. The district court has held, however, that 
Valley Asphalt is limited to a claim for contribution and that the Plaintiffs are shielded from 
such a claim by virtue of the contribution protection they received pursuant to CERCLA § 
113(f)(2), when they settled their own liability with EPA and signed the ASAOCs. 
128
 PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ross Dev. Corp., 104 F. Supp. 3d 729, 739 (D.S.C. 2015). 
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Dichotomy 
District courts that have rejected the possibility of simultaneous cost 
recovery and contribution claims have discerned, in the Atlantic Research 
decision, a dichotomy that does not exist. The decision of the district court 
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin best illustrates the courts’ thinking. In 
Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George Whiting Paper Co.,129 the plaintiffs were 
paper manufacturers engaged in a massive cleanup of the Fox River, near 
Green Bay, Wisconsin. Many of the plaintiffs’ actions were dictated by 
settlement agreements they had made with the EPA, and the plaintiffs 
conceded that they could recover the costs for those actions from non-
settling parties only through contribution claims under § 113.130 The 
plaintiffs had, however, incurred additional costs voluntarily outside the 
scope of those agreements. For those costs, they claimed the right to pursue 
cost recovery under § 107.131 The court, therefore, squarely faced the issue 
of whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to seek contribution under § 113 
while simultaneously pursuing cost recovery claims under § 107 for separate 
expenses they had “voluntarily” incurred. The court opined that, in 
resolving this important question, a court ultimately had to decide whether 
the “focus [should] be on the nature of the costs themselves or on the 
procedural status of the party seeking to recover those costs [i.e., the 
plaintiffs].”132 
It seems the crux of the problem stems from what the courts have 
meant when they say that § 107 is available for a party to recover 
“voluntarily” incurred costs. Does “voluntary” mean that courts should 
analyze all of a PRP’s costs to determine which costs were compelled and 
which were voluntary? Or, instead, did the courts using that term assume 
that once a Government enforcement action began, all costs incurred by the 
PRP no longer qualified as voluntarily incurred costs?133 
Focusing on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Atlantic Research,134 which 
was ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court,135 the district court concluded 
that “courts are not interested in analyzing the particular nature of the costs 
sought (as Plaintiffs prefer) but rather focus simply on the PRP’s procedural 
status, specifically, whether it has been ‘subject’ to an enforcement action.”136 
                                                                    
129
 572 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
130




 Id. at 1042 (emphasis added). 
133
 Id. at 1041–42.  
134
 Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006). 
135
 United States v. Atl. Research Corp. 551 U.S. 128 (2007). 
136
 Appleton Papers, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1042. 
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Assuming that it was faced with an either/or question—and had to decide 
whether to focus on the nature of the costs claimed or on the procedural 
status of the plaintiffs—the court chose to focus on the latter and dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ cost recovery claims. 
Seven years later, a decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States in 
the district court for the Southern District of Texas followed precisely the 
same reasoning.137 Exxon had signed two administrative consent orders with 
the State of Texas for remediation of its Baytown facility.138 After spending 
over $40 million cleaning up the plant, it sued the United States for cost 
recovery under CERCLA § 107. In support of its cost recovery claim, 
Exxon argued, first, that the consent orders with the State did not constitute 
a “resolution of liability” for purposes of CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) because 
it pertained to state regulations and were not tied to a CERCLA cleanup.139 
However, even if the agreements did trigger a right to contribution under 
CERCLA, Exxon asserted that it had incurred substantial cleanup costs for 
almost a decade before entering into those agreements and had, more 
recently, incurred additional costs outside the scope of the agreements.140 
Even if it was limited to recovery by contribution for matters covered in the 
settlement agreements, Exxon argued that it should be allowed to seek cost 
recovery for any costs incurred outside their scope.141 
Citing a number of circuit court decisions for the proposition that 
parties are restricted to contribution actions if contribution is available to 
them142—and drawing upon selected language from the Atlantic Research 
decision emphasizing the “procedural circumstances [of] the PRP”143—the 
district court held that all of Exxon’s response costs were recoverable 
through contribution including those outside the scope of the settlement 
agreements and those incurred before the agreements were signed.144 
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which has 
jurisdiction over Valley Asphalt and the South Dayton Landfill litigation, 
also appears to have followed the minority approach.145 The effect can be 
                                                                    
137
 108 F. Supp. 3d 486 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
138
 The facility was originally owned and operated by Exxon’s predecessor, Humble Oil & 
Refining Company. It included three components that produced synthetic rubber and one 
that produced aviation gasoline to help with the war effort during the 1940s and 50s (World 
War II and Korea). 
139
 Id. at 505. 
140
 Id.  
141
 Id.  
142
 Id. at 506–09.  
143
 Id. at 506. 
144
 Id. at 505–06. 
145
 See Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 336 F. Supp. 3d 888 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
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clearly seen in the court’s decision to deny Valley Asphalt the right to 
countersue Plaintiffs under § 107 for the costs it has independently incurred 
complying with the 2013 UAO.146 
In rejecting Valley Asphalt’s counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, the 
court focused on the company’s procedural status and even failed to address 
the nature of the cost Valley Asphalt was claiming. The court explained that 
Valley Asphalt was “entitled to bring a § 113(f)(1) contribution claim by 
virtue of the fact that it ha[d] been sued [for contribution] in the instant 
action” by the Plaintiffs.147 The court did not respond to Valley Asphalt’s 
argument that the expenses it claimed for vapor extraction mitigation on its 
own property were directly incurred in compliance with a separate 
administrative order.148 The court’s opinion contained only a cursory analysis 
as it apparently concluded that it was following the Sixth Circuit’s lead in 
Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio.149 The court rejected Valley 
                                                                    
146
 Id. at 896–97. 
147
 Id. at 896. 
148
 Id. at 893–97. Valley Asphalt claimed that it had “incurred costs in excess of $220,000 . . 
. in compliance with the terms of a March 2013 [UAO]” for actions including “testing, 
demolition of buildings and installation of a sub-slab vapor mitigation system.” Id. at 894. 
The court’s response was that, because (1) Valley Asphalt’s property is part of the larger site, 
and (2) Plaintiffs were ordered in the 2013 ASAOC to do the same work site-wide, Plaintiffs 
were entitled to contribution from Valley Asphalt for that work and Plaintiffs’ suit to recover 
those costs triggered Valley Asphalt’s eligibility for contribution. Id. at 900–01. 
The court’s response arguably glossed over the EPA’s treatment of Plaintiffs’ 2013 ASAOC 
and Valley Asphalt’s 2013 UAO as parallel responses. The EPA Region 5 personnel were 
obviously aware of both initiatives. The same Regional On-Scene Coordinator transmitted 
the March 22, 2013 UAO to Valley Asphalt by cover letter on May 21, 2013 and the April 
5 ASAOC to the Plaintiffs on May 1. Valley Asphalt’s UAO repeatedly emphasized that the 
“Work to Be Performed” (including design and installation of vapor abatement mitigation 
systems) was “for Valley Asphalt Property.” In addition, the Vapor Intrusion Work Plan 
prepared for EPA by Valley Asphalt’s contractor, Bowser-Morner, specifically noted that “[a] 
group of Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) is working a project parallel to Valley’s in 
accordance with the Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent for 
Removal Action (ASAOC) with USEPA, for the SSDL site.” 
Similarly, the Plaintiffs’ ASAOC specifically states that “EPA recognizes that the 
Respondents have entered into an agreement wherein Respondent Valley Asphalt has 
assumed the obligations set forth in this Consent Order to perform the Valley Asphalt Work 
at the Site and the Group Respondents [Hobart, NCR and Kelsey-Hayes] have assumed the 
obligations set forth . . . to perform the Non-Valley Asphalt Work at the Site.” 
All of the above suggests that Valley Asphalt’s vapor intrusion mitigation work could be 
reasonably viewed as parallel to, rather than duplicative of, the Plaintiffs’ work. 
149
 Id. at 894; Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2014). The 
district court’s reliance was arguably misplaced, as the Sixth Circuit did not address the issue 
in that decision. The only question resolved by the Circuit Court was whether a plaintiff that 
had been sued by the government—thereby meeting the requirement to pursue an action for 
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Asphalt’s assertion that the result was inequitable suggesting that the 
alternative Valley Asphalt proposed would discourage voluntary settlements 
by parties such as the Plaintiffs.150 
The final section of this article suggests that the majority approach to 
this question is more consistent with CERCLA’s statutory text and scheme, 
aligns with the Court’s decision in Atlantic Research, is more equitable than 
the minority approach, and would promote voluntary settlements rather 
than discourage them. 
IV. RESOLVING THE COST RECOVERY/CONTRIBUTION DICHOTOMY 
Resolving the concern raised in the previous section requires courts to 
recognize that both the nature of the cost claimed in a CERCLA action and 
the plaintiff’s procedural posture are relevant in determining the 
appropriate remedy for a private plaintiff. Courts need not choose between 
the two, and neither the text of CERCLA nor the Court’s opinion in Atlantic 
Research suggest otherwise. Instead, the plaintiff’s procedural posture 
regarding each specific cost should control for each claim or counterclaim. 
A. Consistency with CERCLA’s Text and Structure 
Given the way the Court has historically construed CERCLA, one 
would expect it to follow a textualist approach if or when it chooses to 
address this issue.151 The plain meaning of the statutory language would 
therefore guide the Court to the extent its meaning can be discerned.152 
While CERCLA does not directly address this issue, its text and framework 
both suggest an emphasis on discrete liabilities. The outer limits of 
                                                                    
contribution—was precluded from asserting a cost recovery claim for the same expenses. The 
court answered that question in the affirmative, but it did not address whether the plaintiff 
could bring a cost recovery claim for other expenses incurred outside the enforcement 
process. Id. at 776. 
150
 Hobart, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 896–97. 
151
 See Barkett, supra note 68 (asserting that, from Key Tronic Corp., in 1994, to 
Waldeburger, in 2014, the Supreme Court’s decisions have been “guided by the plain 
meaning of CERCLA’s text”). One could add to that list the decisions in Exxon Corp. v. 
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986) and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). This 
pattern has been true of the Court regardless of the perceived political bent of the authors of 
the Court’s opinions (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Kennedy, Stevens and Thomas, for 
example, have all applied a textualist approach). 
152
 See generally, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
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CERCLA liability are specified in § 107(a)(4)(A)–(D).153 The statute casts a 
broad net by imposing liability upon multiple categories of defendants154 and 
providing only a limited number of narrow defenses.155 However, liability 
under CERCLA is “not unlimited.”156 Section 107(a) restricts liability not 
only to costs actually incurred,157 but to those that are both “necessary” and 
                                                                    
153
 Those who are within the four classes of responsible parties listed in § 107(a)(1)–(4) and 
do not meet any of CERCLA’s narrow defenses are liable for: 
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government 
or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with 
the national contingency plan; 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources . . . ; and 
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 
9604(i) of this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4). 
154
 CERCLA § 107(a) imposes liability upon four classes of persons:  
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of 
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such 
hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, 
or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for 
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
such person . . . , and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).  
The courts have also held that liability may extend to corporate parents, subsidiaries and 
successors, corporate officers, directors, and sometimes stockholders or counsel; trustees, 
and even response action contractors. See, e.g., David O. Ledbetter et al., Outline of 
RCRA/CERCLA Enforcement Issues and Holdings, CHEM. WASTE LITIG. REP. (2010). 
155
 CERCLA § 107(b) exempts from liability anyone who can establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that a release or threatened release was caused solely by: “(1) an act of God 
(2) an act of war; or (3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent 
of the defendant . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). In addition § 101(20)(E) defines “owner” in 
such a way as to exempt lenders that do not engage in management of the facility; the third-
party defense in § 107(3) exempts “innocent” landowners, including contiguous landowners, 
subject to certain conditions; and as part of the Brownfields program, an exemption was 
added in § 101(40) for “bona fide prospective purchasers.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(E), 
101(40), 107(3).  
156
 See, e.g., Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Onan Corp. 
v. Indus. Steel Corp., 770 F. Supp. 490, 494 (D. Minn. 1989), aff’d, 909 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 
1990)). 
157
 CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) provides that responsible parties are liable for “any other 
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) 
(emphasis added). 
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spent in a manner “consistent with the national contingency plan.”158 
Furthermore, “contribution” toward a joint liability159 or “settlement” of a 
liability to the United States or a State government160—while possibly entailing 
a substantial sum—is inherently limited in scope. The very nature of 
“contribution” is that it consists of a share of some discreet amount.161 Thus, 
reading the statute as a whole,162 every provision concerning liability under 
CERCLA—whether for cost recovery or contribution—reflects an obligation 
that is, out of necessity, limited in scope. 
The structure of CERCLA also seems consistent with the majority 
position on this issue.163 Section 107(a) provides the basic framework for 
potential liability under CERCLA in broad terms.164 By contrast, § 113(f) 
authorizes contribution actions for PRPs in comparatively narrow, specific 
circumstances. A fair reading of these provisions together would suggest that 
a CERCLA defendant is generally liable for “any . . . necessary costs of 
response,”165 unless the specific circumstances delineated in § 113(f) have 
been met—in which case the plaintiff would be limited to an action for 
contribution.166 CERCLA’s provision for contribution protection reinforces 
this structure.167 It provides contribution protection for a person who has 
“resolved its liability . . . in an administrative or judicially approved 
settlement,” but the protection it provides is expressly limited to “matters 
addressed in the settlement.”168 Thus, the specific terms of the settlement 
dictate the scope of protection the party enjoys. Therefore, under this 
                                                                    
158
 Expenses must be incurred in a manner “not inconsistent with the [NCP]” if the plaintiff 
is a government entity or Indian tribe. Id. at § 9607(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).  
159
 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
160
 Id. § (f)(3)(B). 
161
 This is consistent with the concept of “contribution” as described in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, which characterizes contribution as the recovery of an amount “in excess 
of [a party’s] comparative share or responsibility,” suggesting that a party liable for 
contribution is liable for no more than a share of a specific and limited (though possibly 
substantial) amount. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1995).  
162
 See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 135 (2007) (quoting King v. St. 
Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)) (emphasizing that “[s]tatutes must ‘be read as 
a whole’”). 
163
 See supra notes 21–35 and accompanying text. 
164
 See supra notes 153–157 and accompanying text. 
165
 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
166
 The text of CERCLA does not expressly dictate this result but was so construed by the 
Supreme Court in Cooper Industries. See supra notes 43–60 and accompanying text. 
167
 CERCLA § 113(f)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “A person who has resolved its 
liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement 
shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.” 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). 
168
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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provision, even a settling party is not sheltered from CERCLA claims as a 
whole; it is arguably sheltered only from contribution claims169 and only with 
respect to those matters that are within the scope of the agreement. It seems 
counterintuitive that a statute that carefully limits the terms of liability based 
upon specific procedural circumstances would then lump together all of a 
party’s claims and ignore any procedural distinctions among them. It also 
seems unlikely that Congress would limit contribution protection to the 
scope of a settlement agreement while, at the same time, intending for the 
courts to use the same agreement to dictate the form of recovery for every 
claim that party might be able to assert. 
Exxon’s cleanup of its Baytown facility provides an extreme example.170 
As explained previously, Exxon signed two administrative consent orders 
with the State of Texas in 1995 calling for specific environmental response 
actions at the facility. However, Exxon had already incurred substantial 
cleanup costs beginning in 1986, and it continued to incur cleanup costs 
outside the scope of the two agreements after they were signed.171 Because 
the United States government had been heavily involved with wartime 
production at the facility, Exxon sued the United States for cost recovery 
under § 107 after conducting extensive cleanup.172 
The court determined that the settlement agreements Exxon signed 
with the State constituted “settlements” within the meaning of CERCLA § 
113(f)(3)(B).173 Under § 113(f)(2), therefore, Exxon could have received 
contribution protection. That protection, however, would have been limited 
to the “matters addressed” in the settlements. But despite the limited nature 
of the contribution protection available to Exxon, the court held that the 
same settlements restricted Exxon’s claim against the government to a 
contribution action even for costs that fell outside the scope of the 
agreements or were incurred as much as nine years before the agreements 
were signed. 
B. Consistency with the Atlantic Research Decision 
In addition to being more consistent with the text and structure of 
CERCLA, the approach recommended in this article would comport with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Research. Courts that follow the 
                                                                    
169
 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 140 (2007) (noting that “[t]he 
settlement bar does not by its terms protect against cost-recovery liability under § 107(a),” 
but expressing doubt that “this supposed loophole would discourage settlement”). 
170
 See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
171
 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 3d 486, 505 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
172
 Id. at 502–503. 
173
 Id. at 506. 
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minority approach on this issue have cited two statements from that opinion, 
which they assert support their position. Upon closer examination, however, 
neither statement mandates the minority approach. The first statement is 
actually a quotation from the Second Circuit’s opinion in Consolidated 
Edison,174 which, in context, is at most ambiguous. When referencing the 
Second Circuit’s opinion, the Court emphasized that the remedies of cost 
recovery and contribution are not interchangeable but serve as 
“complement[s]” to one another.175 Pulling a phrase from Consolidated 
Edison to help elaborate that point, the Court explained that §§ 107 and 
113 “provid[e] causes of action ‘to persons in different procedural 
circumstances.’”176 Though minority courts point to that statement for 
support, it does not specify that a party eligible to seek contribution for one 
particular expense is automatically restricted to contribution with respect to 
all of its potential claims or counterclaims. Neither the Supreme Court, in 
Atlantic Research nor the Second Circuit, in Consolidated Edison, was 
faced with that question, and neither explicitly addressed it. 
A number of the lower courts have also cited a second statement from 
Atlantic Research that furnishes a bright-line rule regarding the concurrent 
use of cost recovery and contribution. The rule it articulates, however, is 
very narrow; it does not address the question raised in this article, as some 
courts have suggested.177 Expressing concern over the continued viability of 
§ 113, the Court in Atlantic Research emphasized that a PRP could not 
simply choose which remedy it wished to pursue.178 If a PRP is “eligible to 
seek contribution under § 113(f),” the Court stated, then that party is 
required to use § 113 as its remedy.179 The Court then stated that such a 
plaintiff “[could not] simultaneously seek to recover the same expenses 
under § 107(a).”180 Just as important as what this often-cited rule does say, is 
likely what it does not say. In it, the Court merely precluded the use of both 
§§ 107 and 113 to recover “the same expenses.” It did not clarify whether a 
party could simultaneously seek both remedies to recover different 
expenses. That door, therefore, was left ajar. Not surprisingly, the lower 
courts have reached disparate conclusions on this issue, and further 
clarification from the Court would be helpful. Until then, it is fair to say at 
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least that the approach recommended in this article comports with the 
Court’s most recent guidance. 
C. Addressing Objections 
Jurists and scholars have raised two significant concerns about the 
approach recommended in this article. One objection is that such an 
approach might discourage voluntary settlements. Those familiar with 
CERCLA know that its purposes have always been to (1) promote the 
prompt and effective cleanup of hazardous waste sites and (2) ensure that 
those responsible for the dangers those sites represent pay for their 
remediation.181 One of the keys to achieving these objectives is to encourage 
voluntary cleanups. CERCLA’s contribution protection provision is 
generally viewed as furthering timely cleanups by rewarding early 
settlements.182 Some are concerned that if parties that have settled and 
received contribution protection were later subject to cost recovery claims 
(which presumably would provide joint and several liability),183 the incentive 
to settle early and receive that protection would be reduced. The EPA and 
the Department of Justice have consistently expressed this concern, whether 
writing as parties to litigation or as friends of the court: 
To encourage PRPs to settle with the United States, CERCLA bars 
contribution claims against settling PRPs . . . . It is unclear whether 
that bar, or an equivalent common law bar, would block a § 
107(a)(4)(B) claim brought by one settling PRP against another . . 
. . PRPs will be much less likely to settle with EPA and begin 
cleanup work if they potentially remain vulnerable to such claims.184 
A unanimous Court, in Atlantic Research, foresaw that issue, and 
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, addressed it squarely. He suggested 
that allowing PRPs to pursue cost recovery under § 107 would “not 
eviscerate the settlement bar set forth in § 113(f)(2).”185 First, he suggested, if 
sued for cost recovery a defendant could invoke equitable apportionment 
by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim.186 In determining the parties’ relative shares 
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 See, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996); Dedham Water Co. 
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of liability, a court with discretion to “use[] such equitable factors as [it] 
determines are appropriate”187 would likely account for the fact that the 
defendant had settled early and conducted response actions in fulfillment 
of its settlement.188 Given the cost of litigation, and the likelihood that a 
court’s apportionment would weigh heavily in favor of the defendant in such 
a case, some scholars have questioned whether cost recovery suits would 
often be pursued in such cases.189 Second, the contribution bar would 
continue to provide protection against contribution claims by other private 
or government entities.190 Finally, a settlement with the government would 
still “carr[y] the inherent benefit of finally resolving liability as to the United 
States or a State” regardless of the party’s susceptibility to a cost recovery 
claim from a private claimant.191 
Also, offsetting this concern is the likelihood that additional parties 
might be encouraged to settle without litigation if they knew that cost 
recovery under § 107 would be possible. The South Dayton Landfill 
litigation illustrates this point. Other than owning land that had once been 
part of the landfill, Valley Asphalt’s connection with that part of the site was 
minimal. It had allegedly never deposited waste of any kind at the dump.192 
Nevertheless, it was one of thirty parties sued by the defendants who sought 
contribution after settling claims with the EPA. 
Valley Asphalt later agreed—without being sued—to initiate vapor 
intrusion mitigation measures on its own land at considerable cost. It is not 
clear how much of the contamination that created the need for mitigation 
was caused by other parties, including the Plaintiffs; but Valley Asphalt’s 
engineering consultants found that the soil and groundwater contaminants 
on Valley Asphalt’s property were virtually the same as those found in the 
landfill.193 Following the minority approach, however, the district court 
dismissed Valley Asphalt’s cost recovery counterclaim against the Plaintiffs 
and foreclosed any opportunity to discover the contributing role Plaintiffs 
might have played in the expenses Valley Asphalt incurred. 
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Although Valley Asphalt’s expenditure was not strictly “voluntary,” the 
EPA was able to preserve critical resources because the company was willing 
to act without being forced to do so through the enforcement process. This 
article suggests that the incentives would be greater for parties in Valley 
Asphalt’s position to settle outside of litigation or formal enforcement if 
there were a realistic opportunity to recover a significant portion of their 
costs from other liable parties. 
Others have opined that permitting a § 107 cost recovery claim 
following a judicially approved settlement under § 113(f)(3)(B) would allow 
a plaintiff the benefit of joint and several liability while being shielded from 
a contribution counterclaim.194 This concern is arguably exaggerated, 
however, given the “mutually exclusive approach” the courts have 
consistently followed.195 The Atlantic Research Court unanimously held that 
a party entitled to pursue contribution may seek only that remedy.196 Given 
that a resolution of liability under § 113(f)(3)(B) triggers a claim for 
contribution, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a PRP could 
resolve its liability with a government entity, receive contribution protection 
under § 113(f)(2), and then pursue a cost recovery claim for the same costs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Cooper Industries and Atlantic Research, the Supreme Court 
provided sorely needed clarification regarding private party remedies under 
CERCLA. Twelve years later, however, the boundary between §§ 107 and 
113 remains obscure. Given the many unresolved issues, the disparity of 
approaches among the courts, and the financial stakes for the parties 
involved, the Court would be justified in granting certiorari in an appropriate 
case to help bring clarity. 
One of the issues on which the courts are divided is whether a party 
may simultaneously pursue cost recovery and contribution for separate 
claims or counterclaims. This article suggests that the majority of courts—
which allow parties to pursue both remedies under appropriate 
circumstances—have gotten it right. They have struck a balance that 
comports with the text and structure of CERCLA and rendered decisions 
consistent with the Court’s decision in Atlantic Research. 
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The majority approach also encourages voluntary cleanups and thus 
helps further the goals of CERCLA. Offering the advantages of cost 
recovery to parties that voluntarily remediate a site or conduct cleanups 
beyond the scope required of a settlement agreement promotes the kind of 
behavior CERCLA was intended to encourage. Even parties such as Valley 
Asphalt—whose costs were not truly “voluntary”—make it possible for 
authorities to preserve vital resources when they cooperate in the cleanup 
process without having to be sued. 
Courts that have taken a contrary position have done so based upon a 
false choice between the nature of the costs incurred and the procedural 
posture of the party seeking recovery. The appropriate way to resolve the 
issue is to account for the procedural posture of the party with respect to the 
specific cost it has claimed. A contrary approach does not conform to 
CERCLA’s text and structure and is not mandated by the guidance the 
Court has previously given. 
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